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ABSTRACT 
 
This essay argues that since human experience consists inseparably of mind, body and the 
material world, and that if were are to better understand the lives of people in the past we need 
to recognize that we cannot separate material culture, social process and life-tasks from the 
experiences of the people who carried them out. Personal experience of a thing can never 
produce an understanding of that thing that another might have without first discussing who this 
‘other’ is and what their motivations are for being there. The constitution of experience, as an 
inseparable mix of mind, body and the world prevents the identification, in the present, of 
‘prehistoric’ experiences in the present. An understanding of the theory of human experience 
can, however, demonstrate that change and the appropriation or alteration of activities and 
beliefs for new ends can easily be motivated by the power that certain experiences have on us. 
Thus understanding human experience helps us make new interpretations of the past. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This essay argues that since human experience consists 
inseparably of mind, body and the material world, and 
that if were are to better understand the lives of people 
in the past we need to recognize that we cannot separate 
material culture, social process and life-tasks from the 
experiences of the people who carried them out. This 
means that when, for example, we talk about the 
procured resources, the buried dead or the end of the 
use-life of a house we must remember that it was people 
who did these things. We should also therefore discus 
the experience of such acts.  
The purpose of Tringham’s fictional account (right) of 
the burning of a Vinca culture Neolithic long house is to 
demonstrate that so much of what gives people ‘faces’ is 
lost in archaeology. It is within the theory of human 
experience that we find an explanation for this lack of 
‘faces’ in the past, and possible ways forward, through 
which we might better understand the changing lives of 
prehistoric people. The purpose of this essay, then, is to use an understanding of our experiential 
relationship with the world in the following two case studies. 
The theory of human experience is vast and this essay will focus on only a small selection of 
critical elements; those of memory, identity, familiarity and the constitution of material things. 
The first section is about the philosophy of experience, with the main focus on being on 
examples from the two most popular philosophers within archaeology; Martin Heidegger and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. These examples will form the foundation upon the following two case 
studies. Each case study will consist of contemporary examples of human experience with a 
following discussion of what they teach us about the nature of experience in the present and the 
past. 
Case 1. The Frozen Waves of Järrestad. This case study is about the possibility of using our own 
direct experiences in the present of prehistoric monuments as a way of understanding their 
purpose in the past. It demonstrates that the constitution of human experience preventsany 
‘short cuts’ to understanding a past, which after all, no longer exists and cannot be experienced. 
Case 2. Abandoned Places. Here, the possibility of using an understanding of experiences in a 
specific ‘experience-scape’, that of abandoned places, can give us new insight into the reasons for 
the spread of ideas in Neolithic Europe. By accepting the constitution of experience in 
interpretations of the past we can use the archaeological record to talk not just about material or 
social concerns but also about experiential concerns. The power of lived experiences can be the 
root cause of social change. 
‘She watched the house burn. He had 
died. He’s strung up in the tree now, 
safe. Now it’s time to kill the house. 
Finally after all these years living in 
these godforsaken marshlands. Stuck 
in this place, with no one to turn to or 
help, except him, or worse, her … 
Mustn’t let the fire die, or he’ll come 
back. More wood. Pile it up a bit more 
here. Let in some more air! A house 
must breathe to die. Push the air into 
the cavity. That’s better. Flaming 
again! Burn his pots! Kill his stuff! Now 
I’m in charge. The circle is complete. I 
can go back to the village. Away from 
the heat, away from the creatures that 
torture and bite. Back to village noise, 
complaints, shrieks, laughter, gossip, 
friends, life.’ (Tringham, 1991:124) 
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THE WORLD OF EXPERIENCE 
The ‘world’ of experience does not refer to the common idea of 
the purely material world upon which we stand. It refers to a 
more fundamental world that is defined by human experience, 
actions and social context (Thomas 2004:187ff) and is a world 
that cannot exist without us in it. The basic underlying argument 
is that we only know of the world around us because of the 
simple fact that we see, hear, smell, touch and taste it. In short, 
we experience it. Nothing comes to us through any other 
means. Therefore our experience of the world is the foundation 
upon which every other understanding of it is built. We cannot 
know anything about the world without first making sense of 
our experiences of it. 
The direct study of experience became its own distinct branch of philosophy at the end of the 
19th Century with the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1936) (Mooney & Moran, 2000). Husserl 
was concerned with the fact that although we understood that we could perceive the countless 
objects that surround us in the world we failed to understand how these object actually came to 
be in our minds. Somehow a representation of these objects appears in our mind where we can 
then think about them. To Husserl, the then current conception of a person as being divided 
into two fundamental parts - a mind and a body – could not explain how physical objects 
became mental objects. The aim, then, of his philosophy was to study exactly that point where 
the physical and the mental meet, that is, our experience of the world. 
The ideas of Husserl were quickly absorbed by other, well known philosophers who expanded 
upon the idea of exploring human experience. Within archaeology, the two most well recognized 
philosophers to tackle this issue are Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) - a German philosopher who 
focused on what it is to be a human being – and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), a French 
philosopher who concentrated on the act of perception. Their ideas follow very different paths 
but in some respects they share a great deal. 
1. Both philosophers put experience first. They both argue that our experience of the world 
forms the foundation upon which all other understandings of it are built. We live, first 
and foremost, in a world of human experience and that if we want to understand the 
reality of the physical world we must interpret our experiences of it. 
2. This leads on to the idea that the mind and body separation is a false one. No experience 
can be reduced to nothing more than a physical perception and at the same time cannot 
be reduced to simply a mental process. All experience is a combination of both. 
The verb ‘to experience’ is no easy word to define but as a bare minimum, experience is more 
than simply perception. To experience something - whether this ‘something’ is an object, a place 
or a situation - is to be affected by it, emotionally, physically and intellectually. As a 
simplification, then, experience is a fusion of three main elements of mind, body and the physical 
world. None can be excluded from experience.  
 
Fig. 1. Mind, Body and World are 
interconnected. 
The 
World
The 
Body
The 
Mind
5 | P a g e  
 
THE FAMILIAR WORLD 
 
Living within the world in an everyday sense is done 
without much consideration of its nature or material 
presence at all. A central point in Martin Heidegger’s 
philosophy (Blattner, 2006:49-59) is that during everyday 
life objects usually don’t figure in our consciousness at all 
but are intrinsically a part of our world and available 
‘read-at-hand’ to be used. Si in order to live our everyday 
lives we do not need to think about the objects we use 
when pursuing our goals. We do not think of the 
computer when typing our essays, we think about what we want to write. We do not consider the 
hammer we use to build a set of shelves, we think about what we need to do to complete the 
task. What this shows is that our understanding of the world is first and foremost a pre-reflective 
one, or, as Heidegger puts it, we are ‘familiar’ with the world we live in. The craftsman of 
Blattner’s example (above) does not spend any time considering the tools or materials at hand. 
As Blattner concludes: 
‘Our primordial or originary being-in-the-world is a matter of familiarity, and when it comes to making 
our way about the world, familiarity is a function of competence or mastery.’ (Blattner, 2006:57) 
Heidegger argues that, for us as human beings, the world should not be thought of as a world of 
objects – as we commonly think of it – but rather as a world of situations and goals. The world is a 
process of living as much as it is a material thing. The influential work of Pierre Bourdieu (1980), 
often cited within archaeology, is a theory of practice and explores the actions that take place 
within this ‘familiarity’ with the world. Important as part of this work is that although a person’s 
actions are most often unreflective in nature (remember the example that we think about the 
essay we write, not the keys on the keyboard), they are still structured according to culturally 
specific rules, which are described by Bourdieu as the habitus (1980:52ff). Important in the 
concept of the habitus is that these rules are not fixed, and neither do they determine the 
outcome of a person’s actions; a person uses them as a frame of reference that conditions the 
outcome. These actions need not be conscious ones and can be embedded in this sense of 
familiarity with the world. Giddens (1984) refers to the ability to act unreflectively in the world as 
‘practical consciousness’ (Giddens, 1984:41-45). 
‘When I renovated my house…and had 
the pleasure of observing a master 
craftsman at work, I noticed that he 
could joke around and offer personal 
and political wisdom, while all the 
while making a perfectly straight cut, 
often not looking the whole time at 
what he was doing.’ (Blattner, 
2006:57) 
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THE WORLD OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY 
 
It is memory that allows us to experience, indeed, 
without memory we would not be aware of anything at 
all, being constantly trapped in the present and unable 
to draw on past experience. The present, including the 
things of the physical world that we perceive are, in 
part, created from the memory of past experiences. 
Further, we can argue that what we perceive cannot be 
pinpointed to a particular moment in time since it is 
constituted in part from past memories, that is (to state 
the obvious) experiences that happened in the past. As 
such memory should not be seen as simply a device to 
recall past events into consciousness, but actively 
contributes to our experiences in the present, even in 
our unreflective, routine, familiar actions in everyday 
life (Giddens, 1984, p.45-49). 
In Pierre Nora’s (1989) essay on places and memory he 
talks of the distinction between places of memory (lieux de memoire) and environments of memory 
(milieux de memoire), where lieux de memoire represent places (such as monuments) constructed 
for the purpose of fixing a historical narrative in people’s memories. Milieux de memoire represent 
places where actual memories are constructed and maintained; places with strong personal 
experiences attached to them. What is interesting here is that places (and objects) have such a 
powerful effect on the memory and on experience at all. Lieux de memoire work as anchors for a 
historical narrative and are used to appropriate people’s memory of historical events, thus erasing 
or altering their own memory to fit the historical narrative.  
It is precisely because physical objects and places have such a 
strong role in remembering that this appropriation is possible at 
all, and the root of this power lie in the previous argument: that 
our experiences of the world are both enabled and formed by 
our memories. To put it crassly, to alter someone’s memories is 
to alter how they perceive the world, and to alter their identity. 
Our identity is intimately entangled with the places and things 
that surround us, and that we use in our activities. The self is 
not just in the mind, but in the world in which we dwell. 
Furthermore, it must hold that if our identities cannot be 
disentangled from the places and the objects that surround us, 
then what objects and places are cannot be disentangled from us 
and our identities. 
 
  
‘... we should be aware of the difference 
between true  memory, which has taken 
refuge in gestures and habits, in skills 
passed down by unspoken traditions, in 
the body's inherent self knowledge, in 
unstudied reflexes and ingrained 
memories, and memory transformed by 
its passage through history, which is 
nearly the opposite: voluntary and 
deliberate, experienced as a duty, no 
longer spontaneous; psychological, 
individual, and subjective; but never 
social, collective, or all encompassing. 
How did we move from the first 
memory, which is immediate, to the 
second, which is indirect? (Nora, 
1989:13) 
 
 
Fig. 3. King Karl Gustav XI. A lieux 
de memiore in Malmö, Sweden. 
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PERCEIVING THE PHYSICAL WORLD 
 
In 1948 Maurice Merleau-Ponty presented a series of 
shows on French radio where he attempted to describe 
the ideas of his philosophy to a popular audience. The 
transcripts of the shows were later published (Merleau-
Ponty 2004). In the third show, entitled ‘Exploring the 
World of Perception: Sensory Objects’ Merleau-Ponty 
discussed how we actually perceive objects that surround 
us and rejected the common, materialistic notion that an 
object is a sum of a number of material properties. 
Lemons, for example, cannot be seen as: 
‘...a bulging, oval shape plus this fresh feel plus this acidic 
taste.’  (Merleau-Ponty 2004:59, original emphasis) 
This is because it does not explain how it is that we see 
lemons as a ‘unified entity’. Each property of the lemon 
is not separate data but that they are connected and affect 
each other and us, the subject. What he meant was that in 
experiencing objects we are intimately bound into a 
dialogue with objects, colours can affect us emotionally, smell can trigger memories, and so on. 
So even a simple lemon cannot be fully understood as a sum of its properties such as its 
‘...bulging, oval shape plus this fresh feel...’ 
Merleau-Ponty took the idea further by discussing the properties of honey and the effect honey 
has on the body. The example he used referred to the hand that tries to grasp honey and how the 
physical – or bodily – relationship to the object is a part of its very definition. Here he meant 
that this quality of honey as being a viscous, sticky liquid is not something that exists on its own, 
it exists only in relation to the human body that tries to grasp it, and that properties of things are 
intimately bound up with the viewing subject. The example of honey and the hand that grasps it 
also serves, therefore, as a metaphor for the interrelationship between ourselves and the object 
world.  
‘The things of the world are not simply neutral objects which stand before us for our contemplation. Each 
one of them symbolises or recalls a particular way of behaving, provoking in us reactions which are 
favourable or unfavourable.’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2004:63). 
The things that surround us are therefore not as simple as might be 
thought. The objects that we experience cannot be fully 
understood as a list of physical properties because within 
experience every object is always far more than these properties, 
indeed the properties themselves separated from the viewing 
subject. Objects in human experience are the result of a process of 
objectification involving the mind, body and the physical world. 
‘Honey is a slow-moving liquid; while 
it undoubtedly has a certain 
consistency and allows itself to be 
grasped, it soon creeps slyly from the 
fingers and returns to where it started 
from. It comes apart as soon as it has 
been given a particular shape and, 
what is more, it reverses the roles by 
grasping the hands of whoever would 
take hold of it. The living, exploring 
hand that thought it could master this 
thing instead discovers that it is 
embroiled in a sticky external object. 
*…+ So the quality of being honeyed … 
can only be understood in the light of 
the dialogue between me as an 
embodied subject and the external 
object which bears this property.’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 2004:61) 
 
Fig. 2. A Lemon 
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FROM THE FAMILIAR WORLD TO THE PHYSICAL. OBJECTIFICATION 
 
We are capable of bringing the things that 
surround us into consciousness, of course, but 
this is an unusual situation for us (Blattner, 2006) 
which, counter-intuitively, makes the physical 
world actually more abstract to us as human beings 
than the familiar one. The physical world that we 
think we experience entirely unproblematically is 
in fact a construction, at least in part.  
One of the triggers that makes us consciously 
aware of the material world is when an object 
needed to complete our goals ceases to work as 
expected. Suddenly the computer crashes while 
writing an essay, or the hammer breaks when 
hammering in the last nail of the shelves 
(Blattner, 2006:49-52). It is often only then that the physical world truly comes to our attention 
in the manner described in the previous section (‘Perceiving the Physical World’ on p. 7). 
If we consciously consider any object around us it is an act of interpretation and so material 
objects such as computers or a hammers are not fundamental ‘units’ in the physical world, but 
are ‘revealed’ during a process of perception or, as Thomas (2004:187ff) puts it, we ‘unworld’ 
them so that they become objects in our perception. Merleau-Ponty describes it as if objects ‘rise 
up like sparks from a fire’ from the background that is the familiar world (in which we normally 
live and operate). Perceiving physical things is an act of interpretation because, referring back to 
the section ‘Perceiving the Physical World’, since a computer, for example, is a creation of both 
the material object and the Mind. It is argued therefore that meaning does not reside in an object 
or purely in the subject’s mind but that the object is inherently meaningful to us as part of our 
presence in the world. This is because since the moment of its creation (in perception) we imbue 
it with meaning; it is in part a creation of our minds just as much as it really exists in the material 
world. 
It follows therefore that we cannot argue for a fundamental separation between the self and the 
world. The distinction between the physical world and the mind is blurred by arguing that this 
state of familiarity (see ‘The Familiar World’ on p. 5) must be constituted by both. A person’s 
identity is therefore not simply ‘in the mind’ and cannot be separated from the world around us. 
Blattner puts it thus: 
‘We are not just absorbed in the world, but our sense of identity, of who we are, cannot be disentangled 
from the world around us. We are what matters to us in our living; we are implicated in the world.’ 
(Blattner, 2006:12) 
Our sense of identity is also ‘embedded in how we live, rather than how we think or talk’ 
(Blattner, 2006:39, original emphasis) 
 
Fig. 4. A crashed computer. 
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SUMMARIZING THEORY 
 
Already there are many threads to the human experience of the world presented here and it is a 
representation that forces us to doubt some of the ideas that seem most concrete and reliable to 
us. As argued above, we do not spend all of our time in a world of objects at all but are usually 
far more concerned with the goals and thoughts that occur to us at any given time. This ‘familiar 
world’ is a world of unconscious action and interaction or, as Giddens (1984:41-45) puts it, a 
world of ‘physical consciousness’. It is a place so familiar to us that we need not consciously 
consider it at all. When we do become consciously aware of objects in the world this is an act of 
objectification, and interpretation of our human experience. 
In archaeology, narratives of the past are full of ‘stuff’ in the sense that the objects we attempt to 
describe ‘objectively’ are reduced to the status of a list of physical properties although attempts 
have been made to explore this issue (e.g.; Magnusson Staaf, 1996). It follows that the existence 
of past people that we try to create from such archaeological ‘stuff’ are also reduced. In 
archaeology, when we say that, for example, a pattern of post holes is a Neolithic long house, or 
that a recovered stone object is a flint axe, we have barely begun to capture what these things 
really are to the people that made them. We must be aware that what they are to us is not the 
same as what they were to the people that originally made and used them in the past. The 
difference between the artefact from ‘then’ to ‘now’ goes far beyond the N-transforms of 
Michael Schiffer (1996). 
In the world of human experience we no longer talk about objects and places as simple, neutral 
things because as human beings, we also construct the things we experience out of our identities, 
which are themselves historically, socially and culturally situated (e.g.; Coudart, 2006:135). 
Identity and objects and the world we live in cannot be separated from each other. 
The following case studies will try to explore the possibilities that a theory of experience raises 
for archaeology. 
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CASE 1. THE FROZEN WAVES OF JÄRRESTAD 
 
The theoretical understanding of experience is only of 
use to archaeologists if it is implemented in practice, and 
phenomenological approaches set out to do just this. 
They aim to explore the direct experience of – most 
often - prehistoric monuments as an aid to understanding 
their original purpose. However, while phenomenological 
approaches are a common and accepted part of 
ethological studies (e.g.; Frykman & Gilje, 2003), within 
archaeology they are fraught with controversy (e.g.; 
Brück, 2005) because, plainly, archaeologists cannot 
experience the past in the same way that an ethnologist 
experiences the present: the past does not exist as a place 
to be visited. The key to a successful phenomenology of prehistoric monuments must therefore 
rely on the idea that some part of human experience in the present has something in common 
experiences in the past. Without this common bond, any experiential study would be no more 
informative than empirical observation. Phenomenological approaches within archaeology must 
argue their value despite these difficulties and this case study therefore aims to address the 
following question which, if answered, allows the phenomenological approach itself to be 
evaluated: 
Is there any common experiential bond between all people that can provide a basis for interpreting the past and 
how do people’s individual identities affect their experiences in the present? 
In order to do this the phenomenological method, as described by Christopher Tilley (1994, 
2004) will be employed in order to repeat a field study conducted by Tilley (2004:147-216) of the 
Bronze Age rock carvings at Järrestad in Scania, southern Sweden. The goal is not, however, to 
conduct a phenomenological exploration of the site in order to understand its role in the past, 
but to focus on the phenomenological process of exploring the monument in the present, 
looking for evidence of how interpretations of the past might be formed. We need to explore 
how ‘subjective’ phenomenological observations really are if we are to attribute them to the 
people of the past.  
The method is therefore to start by making a diary containing details of what I can remember of 
the site from various sources and details of what I expect to find during the field study. The diary 
will also contain some of my expectations prior to the field work in order to later asses their 
influence. Next, Tilley’s field study and interpretations of the Järrestad rock carvings will be read 
to provide a basis for my own pre-conceived ideas of the site and its possible interpretations. A 
visit the site will be made in order to conduct my own phenomenological field study. It will be 
documented using field notes and photographs. Finally, the above ‘data’ will be used to assess 
how my experiences of the site at Järrestad were affected by my prior knowledge and pre-
conceived ideas (from Tilley). The effectiveness of the phenomenological approach will then be 
discussed. 
Knowledge is experiential as much as 
it is intellectual, the material world 
around us is intrinsically meaningful 
at an experiential level, it does play a 
part in the construction of cultural 
meaning and cannot be reduced to 
either one or the other. Therefore, in 
theory, by visiting and experiencing a 
place such as an ancient monument, 
we can attempt to rediscover some of 
the experiential meaning of the place 
during the past (Tilley 2004:2ff).  
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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD 
 
‘Archaeological phenomenology’ has most often been 
applied to the study of landscapes, monuments and 
architecture (although see Fuglestvedt, 2005) and is 
particularly popular in the UK. As a method it has been 
spearheaded by Christopher Tilley (1994, 2004a, 2004b) 
who argues for phenomenological field studies where 
monuments should be directly experienced if they are to 
be properly understood. Rather than employing a 
phenomenological method as Tilley has done, other 
archaeologists such as Thomas (1999) and Bradley (1998) 
have used a theoretical understanding of the nature of 
experience in their work in order to relate concepts of 
experiencing space to Neolithic monuments. Both have 
used a large quantity of empirical evidence in 
combination with a recognition of the importance of 
understanding human experience (rather than an explicitly phenomenological method as argued 
by Tilley) to explain why such megalithic monuments were built and how they represented the 
shifting ideology of Mesolithic hunters. 
The fundamental aim of a phenomenological method is to describe the phenomena that present 
themselves to us in our experiences and nothing more. It is not intended to be used for abstract 
theorizing about how the world should be, or of what it might be constituted – in contrast to the 
majority of philosophical discourse. By stripping away our preconceived (reflective) ideas of what 
we are experiencing we can, it is argued, look again at what at first seems familiar and 
unproblematic and to reach a new understanding of such phenomena (Tilley, 2004a:1). In 
contrast to Tilley’s text (to the upper right) I have deliberately used the word ‘phenomena’ 
instead of ‘objects’. Phenomenology is not just about the study of physical objects; it can be used 
to describe all experienced phenomena such as emotions, events and so on. What this means is 
that we are to try to bring into consciousness those aspects of our existence in the world that are 
usually so familiar (‘The Familiar World’, p. 5) that we barely notice them. In the context of 
exploring archaeological sites such as the rock carvings at Järrestad this amounts, in practice, to 
an attempt not just to focus on the objects that surround us, but also to how they affect us. We 
need to become aware of how we behave and act in different environments, what draws our 
attention vs. what seems hidden, what paths do we naturally take when moving around, and even 
what impressions or feelings we might experience in such places. As a descriptive exercise we 
should not ‘filter’ what we experience according to assumptions of what might be important or 
not and, very importantly, any theoretical ideas we might have about places. Only after such 
work is done should we begin to interpret how and if such observations can be incorporated into 
an interpretation of the place (Tilley, 2004:1-31). 
  
Phenomenology involves the attempt 
to describe the objects of 
consciousness in the manner in which 
they are presented to consciousness. 
It attempts to reveal the world as it is 
actually experienced directly by a 
subject as opposed to how we might 
theoretically assume it to be. The aim 
is not to explain the world (in terms, 
say, of physical causality or historical 
events or psychological dispositions) 
but to describe the world as precisely 
as possible in the manner in which 
human beings experience it. (Tilley, 
2004:1)  
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CRITIQUE OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD 
 
The first criticism of phenomenology refers to the common experiential bond between people; 
that there is a level of experience, prior to the application of cultural meaning that is shared by all 
humans in all times (Tilley, 2004:31). Tilley continues to write that the phenomenological study 
of places and landscapes is about ‘...what places and landscapes do to the body, what effects they 
have, prior to the specificities of cultural meaning’, while Thomas (1999:35) writes that 
‘...humans beings do not come upon a world of shapes and forms and add meaning: their world 
is inherently meaningful.’ In experiencing a place, how much of that experience is culturally 
specific and how much is a part of the ‘human universal’? Different aspects of the ‘human 
universal’ have been criticized by Brück (2005). These aspects focus on the common material 
bonds of the body and the world. 
Many question the interpretations that have been made within archaeology. For example, 
Fleming (1999) criticizes Tilley’s (1994) interpretation of Welsh megalithic monuments since, he 
argues, the empirical data simply does not support this interpretation. The title of Fleming’s 
article is, tellingly ‘Phenomenology and the Megaliths of Wales: A Dreaming too far?’ and he argues that 
the only way to interpret the archaeological record is through critical and logical debate of the 
evidence. Fleming’s criticisms ultimately focus on Tilley’s interpretations and not on the 
phenomenological method itself although he implies that it amounts to little more than a 
‘dreaming’ on the part of the archaeologist.  
A final criticism of this method by Coudart (2006:135) is that 
the past does not exist any more and cannot be directly 
experienced. What, then, is the value of such an exploration? 
The idea that we share ‘carnal bodies’ (Tilley, 2004b:201) with 
past people seems appears to neglect the fact that ‘a body is not 
only a physical, but also a social and cultural, construction set in 
a specific historical time’ (Coudart, 2006:135). So claiming that 
present day experiences have relevance in the past, at least if 
based on this claimed common bond, are irrelevant. 
 
RESEARCH DIARY 
 
In order to assess the role of past experiences in the construction of those in the present, an 
important part of the study is to try to record as faithfully as possible the prior knowledge and 
pre-conceived ideas that I, as the experiencing subject, have of both the rock carvings of 
Järrestad and the outcome of the project. This will help me to assess the results after the field 
work is completed. 
  
‘I must confess that I see no 
connection, but rather a 
contradiction, between 
phenomenology (particularly 
Heidegger’s) and the study of 
the past – a past as an object 
to be explored in a time that 
no longer exists (even if the 
present and the future are 
always the heirs of the past).’ 
(Coudart, 2006:135) 
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BEFORE THE TRIP. FROM MEMORY 
 
I am sitting in my kitchen writing the first draught of a research plan for the phenomenological 
investigation of Tilley’s Phenomenological Method. I have visited the site of the Järrestad rock 
carvings once before in the company of some friends about 18 months ago, after skimming 
through Tilley’s phenomenological study of the site in his book ‘The Materiality of Stone’. I 
have, therefore, some knowledge of what to expect once I arrive. The following is a summary of 
what I remember (entirely from memory so it might be completely incorrect), both from books 
and from my previous trip. 
 The carvings apparently date to the Bronze Age although I am vague on the exact dates. 
 
 They cover an exposed surface of Cambrian sandstone, the surface of which is rippled, 
much like the sea, frozen in stone (this is Tilley’s metaphor). The rippling effect is the 
result of the petrification of the old sandy seabed. 
 
 The carvings are, according to Tilley, divided into zones. Each zone is demarcated by 
natural cracks in the rock surface and each zone represents some kind of unity. 
 
 The carvings are placed so that in order to see them properly one needs to circle round 
the rock surface. 
 
 It was very difficult to see some of the carvings due to erosion and the wearing effect of 
tourist feet. Some were never very deeply carved to begin with and I wonder whether 
they were originally painted in or not. 
 
 The motifs include feet, boats, men with axes (and erect penises), acts of ploughing(?) 
and the famous ‘dancing woman’ although I can’t remember if it is supposed to be 
interpreted as a man or a woman (or indeed if there are other interpretations). 
 
 The footsteps have been interpreted by Richard Bradley as the footsteps of the dead 
heading down towards the sea (I think). 
 
 The location in the landscape is at the western end of a shallow valley that points towards 
the sea to the east (the Baltic sea). 
 
 
  
Date: 2007-11-26. Time: Afternoon 
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BEFORE THE TRIP. EXPECTATIONS 
 
I have some pre-conceived expectations of the results of the journey and it will be interesting to 
try to assess their impact on the actual results. 
 Tilley focuses a great deal on the relationship between body and the world and doesn’t 
address the role of our own previous, contextual experiences in the construction of the 
present. I expect to find that my reading of Tilley’s interpretation will strongly affect my 
own interpretation. I imagine that I will be constantly ‘referring’ to what Tilley writes 
about the place, and wonder whether I will be able to mentally ‘put aside’ his 
interpretation. I believe that if Tilley’s interpretation affects my own too much then we 
have to question how valuable the approach is. 
 
 I am also interested in assessing how those features which are obviously from the present 
(paths, tourist information signs, etc) affect how the site is viewed by me. I don’t recall 
Tilley ever mentioning these in his interpretations and therefore it is impossible to assess 
how they might have influenced him. Tilley presents his work as if it is divorced from his 
own context, that is, his own identity, prior knowledge. He seems to have conducted it 
outside of the present, perhaps in the past or at an unidentified point in time. 
 
 I wonder if it is possible to assess, to some degree, how much our experiences are 
similar. 
 
 My research goal, while conducted using the same method at the same place, is different. 
How will this affect my experience of the Järrestad rock carvings? 
 
 I haven’t pre-read his conclusions at the end of his book, ‘The Materiality of Stone’ 
although I have read through it previously (over a year ago). I cannot remember any 
specific details about the contents of the conclusion apart from that he discusses the 
aims and implications of his research and details some of his research goals. 
 
  
Date: 2007-12-07. Time: Afternoon 
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THE TRIP. FROZEN WAVES OR MUDDY WATERS? 
 
THE APPROACH 
The approach to the site is made along and through 
a series of modern features such as a farmer’s track, 
a wooden gate and into the site area which is 
completely surrounded by a high wooden fence 
with electrified fencing surrounding that. The site 
appears to be placed in the middle of a farm. In 
Tilley’s description of the site these most 
dominating facts about its position in the landscape 
are not mentioned at all. Of the nine photographs in 
the entire case study (which includes a number of 
other Bronze Age sites in southern Sweden), only 
two show any obviously modern features at all – 
one shows a wheat field (Tilley, 2004a:189) while 
another shows some low buildings, mostly concealed (Tilley, 2004a:156). I agree with Tilley’s 
description (Tilley, 2004a:172) and the site does indeed feel isolated though not in the sense that 
he describes. The site feels deliberately isolated from the surrounding countryside both by being 
placed within a farm to which it does not belong, and by being surrounded by a modern fence 
on all sides. 
FIRST STEPS 
There is the obligatory small information sign by the 
gate into the site area which gives details of the site 
including some text about the unique figure of the 
dancer. My next move was to head straight across 
the rock surface to locate this figure which is 
positioned in the bottom left section of the rock 
surface. The direct path to the dancer from the 
entrance cuts across the rock surface from top right 
to bottom left. The surface is visibly cleaner and 
smoother on this path, suggesting that I moved 
exactly as most of the tourists to the sight move. It 
seemed natural to go straight to the dancer given the 
information on the sign and wasn’t something I 
reflected over at the time. Already my actions have 
been affected by prior knowledge; that which is printed on the information board, installed by 
Riksantikvarieämbetet (The Swedish Heritage Board). The ‘dancer’, or ‘swimmer’ as Tilley 
describes it (according to Riksantikvarieämbetet), is the site’s main attraction although I’m not 
sure I would even have noticed it or given it special attention had the sign (and previous studies 
of the site) not pointed it out. 
Date: 2004-12-14.  
Time: Lunchtime 
 
 
Fig. 5. The gate into the Järrestad site. 
 
Fig. 6. A dancer or a swimmer? 
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WANDERING THE SURFACE 
 
I wanted to try to see some of the structuring of the carvings as interpreted by Tilley (2004a:178-
184) and others so my next move was to explore the surface by wandering, more or less at 
random, looking at things that caught my eye. It was difficult to see any of the structuring that is 
presented such studies. This is partly because many of the carvings are difficult to make out, and 
in partly because the surface is too large to see properly more than a tiny part of the whole when 
standing on it. A phenomenological study seems ill-suited to this kind of distribution analysis 
unless significant patterns are already well-known and familiar. 
The most distinctly phenomenological contribution that Järrestad provides for the 
interpretations in Tilley’s book is the idea that the surface appears as a series of ‘frozen waves’ 
that permeate the meanings of the carvings themselves (Tilley, 2004a:176). The dancer becomes 
a swimmer (Tilley, 2004a:177), footsteps relate to the sea, the surface is an inversion of the real 
sea; a sea of the dead). My impression, no matter how I twisted and turned this metaphor in my 
mind, was the complete opposite, however. The rock pavement seemed remarkably flat, 
especially where the carvings have been made (along the left-hand side). The right hand side, 
where the ripples are most visible, is completely free from carvings and there is nothing to 
indicate whether this part was visible at the time of the Bronze Age. Even there the ripples are 
not evenly spaced or sized as the waves of the sea would be, nor are they particularly clear, 
although grey weather at noon is the worst time of day to see such features. Why, when looking 
at the same surface, do I see a flat surface when Tilley sees frozen waves? Is it simply because I 
want to refute Tilley’s conclusions in order to make my own point? Earlier in Tilley’s case study 
(Tilley, 2004a:157) he has placed a photograph of a similar surface whose ripples really do look 
like the waves of the sea. Is this why he sees them here at Järrestad? In any case the root of this 
experiential difference lies in our different memories and goals; in short, our subjective selves. 
Fig. 7. Frozen waves on the surface? 
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SKIN AND BONES 
The famous ‘skin and bones’ analogy (Tilley, 2004b:201-202) seems almost irrelevant at Järrestad. 
The idea appears to have originated during a field study of the Dorest landscape but the 
topography there (the ‘bones’) is far more dramatic that at Järrestad, where the landscape is very 
gently rolling. At Järrestad, the ‘skin’ (flora, cultural changes to the landscape) is relatively far 
thicker than it would be in the Welsh mountains, and good tree cover here would radically alter 
the experience of the landscape, both visually and in movement. Roads, field systems and 
buildings in this area have had a relatively far greater impact on the ‘bones’ of the landscape at 
Järrestad (see fig. 8). 
 
The nature of the stone surface changes quite dramatically where tourist feet do not keep the 
surface nice and clean. This clearly affects our experience of the stone in ways unexplored in 
Tilley’s field study. The idea of the ‘skin and bones’ analogy is to establish a common bond 
between past and present experiences but even the thinnest ‘skin’ can change the nature of what 
is being experienced quite dramatically (see fig. 9 and fig. 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Thick skin and thin bones. The gentle landscape around Järrestad 
 
Fig. 9. Less ‘tourist traffic’ on the pavement 
surface. 
 
Fig. 10. Even less ‘tourist traffic’ on the 
pavement. 
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Returning to the point about the exposure of the pavement area it appears that the area of the 
surface most likely to have been covered over during the Bronze Age is that area where the 
waves are most pronounced. This is not simply because there are no carvings to be found there 
(although this is a contributing factor) but because of the nature of the edges of the pavement 
itself. The bottom and right-hand edges disappear under the grass (fig. 11) while the top and left-
hand edges stand above the grass (fig. 12). 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 11. The waved edge of the pavement. Not very wavey, no carvings and easy for vegetation to cover it. 
 
Fig. 12. The carved edge of the pavement. Flat, lots of carvings and more likely to be exposed. 
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WHAT WAS AND WHAT IS 
A sense of freedom to explore the site comes first only after one’s own pre-conceived questions 
and ideas (‘Before the Trip. From Memory’, p. 13) - such as any connection to the Bronze Age -  
have been exhausted. I then find that I am able to explore the site more on my own terms. It is 
difficult to put aside my prior knowledge of Tilley’s (and others) work until this point is reached, 
however, since reading what another has to say about a place forms a pre-understanding that 
first needs to be tested. 
The modern cultural landscape dominates every experience at the site and in the surrounding 
landscape and the significance of any experience to an interpretation of the Bronze Age is 
impossible to disentangle from the present. It is surrounded by farms, fenced in, polished by 
tourist feet, likely managed to keep the surface clear, the appearance of the grass is different 
from inside to outside the site due to differing usage (see fig. 13 and fig. 14) and there is evidence 
that much of the pavement might be covered by flora quite quickly were it allowed to do so (see 
fig. 11 and fig. 12). 
What became most strikingly obvious at Järrestad was the difficulty – if not impossibility - of 
separating the present-day cultural landscape from anything ‘Bronze Age’. The initial stage of my 
investigation was about judging for myself what has been said and written about the site 
previously. The next was more about what might or might not have been of significance during 
the Bronze Age. There are, however, no observations about the Bronze Age that can be made 
with any certainty at all. In fact, attempting to do so within a phenomenological investigation 
goes against the whole point of such an investigation in the first place; that is, no pre-conceived 
ideas about what the place should be (‘The Phenomenological Method’, p. 11). The very fact that 
the site is a significant Bronze Age site is an interpretation! So undoubtedly my prior knowledge 
of the place has affected how I approach it. I find myself constantly referring to what I know of 
the place in order to judge for myself what the place might mean. 
 
Fig. 13. Outside the site area the 
appearance of the land is quite different… 
 
Fig. 14. …from the inside of the site area. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have tried to explore and describe all aspects of the site at Järrestad without recourse to pre-
conceived ideas about what the place might be only to discover how difficult it is to put aside 
such preconceptions, and actually found it impossible to go beyond my pre-knowledge until my 
curiosity was exhausted. I have not tried to see the site as it might have been in the past and in fact, 
the phenomenological investigation of the site itself teaches us that we cannot experientially 
separate past from present, or date experiences to any point in time, other than the present. In 
order to argue that experiential evidence had relevance in the distant past we need to separate 
what was from what is, however. In order to do this our experiences of places like Järrestad must 
first be consciously objectified and examined against the question: ‘Is this 
experience/observation relevant to the Bronze Age or not?’ Objectifying experience is an 
interpretation of experience leading to a newly created narrative of an experience (see ‘From The 
Familiar World to The Physical. Objectification’, p. 8). I disagree entirely with Tilley about the 
both the ‘frozen waves’ and the ‘skin and bones’ metaphors, but neither are matters that must be 
resolved, that is, we do not need to decide which one of us is correct on these points. Although 
we experienced the same physical location our experiences were very different. I cannot deny 
him his experience of the ‘frozen waves’ of Järrestad and he cannot deny me mine and so in the 
present both ideas of the surface of the pavement stand as equally valid, at least experientially. 
This demonstrates that places have multiple experiential possibilities so to relate experiences in 
the present to the distant past is moot issue. Experiences were certainly as multiple then as they 
are now and any (or none) could be argued to be relevant. 
In reference to the criticisms outlined above (see ‘Critique of the Phenomenological Method’, p. 
12) the phenomenological study of Järrestad shows that the first two rather miss the point. The 
general criticisms outlined in Brück (2005) against the similarities between the bodies and the 
worlds of past and present is demonstrably irrelevant in this context. Two similar people in the 
same social context and at the same place can have different experiences. It simply does not 
matter if bodies and places are the same. Fleming’s (1999) critique of the phenomenological 
approach as a ‘dreaming’ fails to give credit to the multiplicity of experience, whether past or 
present. His critique holds only if you believe in the past as a single ‘true’ narrative of events. It is 
the concern raised by Coudart (2006:135) seems most compelling. Whether there is a theoretical 
contradiction between a phenomenological approach applied to the past depends a little on 
whether the past really no longer exists. The past may not be a ‘place’ to be visited but it has 
been argued (Olivier, 2004), that the past exists all around us, ‘mixed’ with all other ‘pasts’ and 
the present and indeed this is a necessary part of Tilley’s phenomenological method. Even so, if 
the past is in fact present then it must be separable and identifiable from the present, which in my 
experience during this field study, is a little like trying to extract the blue from a pot of green 
paint. The blue is always present but inseparable from green, rather, it is a part of green’s 
constitution. 
Despite the above criticism, a phenomenological approach can contribute to an understanding of 
the past but not at a ‘short cut’ to the past. By doing phenomenology we become far more aware 
of the role of experience in our lives and, I believe, is the only way to get to grips with the issues 
of experiencing the world. Such an understanding can lead to new interpretations of the past and 
the following case study will explore just such possibilities. 
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CASE 2. ABANDONED PLACES 
 
In the previous case study a prehistoric site, the Bronze Age rock carvings at Järrestad, was 
visited and the multiplicity of experience that any place can inspire was demonstrated. The same 
place can be ‘seen’ in many different ways. An archaeological site also has multiple uses and 
meanings throughout time in prehistory (e.g.; Godsen & Lock, 1998), up to and including the 
present day, when a place can even become the site of legend, parties and  archaeological 
investigation (e.g.; Holtorf, 1998). 
Many texts within archaeology and the social sciences in general discuss spaces and places, and 
their roles in human life (e.g.; Bourdieu, 1980; Giddens, 1984; Moore, 1996; Tilley, 1994, 2004a, 
2004b; Thomas, 1999) from different perspectives. What is common amongst them, and of 
particular interest here, is the interrelation between people and places, in that both are 
constituted by the other. Space can be structured according to ideals and practical considerations 
but then people and their ideals are also structured according to the places and spaces they 
experience. What is clear, especially from the anthropological field work of Bourdieu (1980) and 
Moore (1996), is that the process of ‘decoding’ the structure of places cannot be done without 
reference to the people that dwell within them. In short, our identities are also formed according 
to the places we experience. We cannot therefore talk about places without reference to how 
they were (and are) used, and by whom. 
 
AIM 
 
The aim of this, the second, case study, is to explore a specific kind of place - abandoned places - 
and the kinds of experiences that can occur within them. In human experience, abandoned 
places are also a part of an act of abandonment and the experience of abandoning are not separable. This 
is an obvious point but rarely acknowledged or explored within archaeology, perhaps due to the 
material nature of the archaeological record. It important nonetheless to recognize that 
interpreting archaeological sites we are also interpreting human experiences. 
In order to achieve this aim, examples of actions and experiences in abandoned places from 
contemporary archaeological sources will be discussed in terms of their experiential content. The 
prehistoric phenomenon to be explored is the apparent abandonment of the early Neolithic long 
houses of central Europe and their connection to the long barrows in Atlantic Europe. 
It must be made clear that the aim is not to draw ethnographic parallels between past and 
present in terms of universal behavior or emotional responses to abandoned places but to 
examine experiential processes involving memory, identity, familiarity and objectification, and to 
see how these processes might contribute to the interpretation of the past. 
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EXPERIENCING ABANDONED PLACES 
 
As areas of study, abandoned places have 
attracted much research in recent years. Some 
focus on the economic history such places 
represent (e.g.; Jörnmark, 2007) while others 
focus on the activities of people and what these 
activities reflect about society (e.g.; Edensor, 
2004). While modern western society usually 
considers abandoned houses and factories to be 
dangerous wastelands and marked as ‘off limits’ 
they actually give rise to a wide range of human 
activities including plundering, home-making 
and adventurous play (Edensor, 2004:21-51). In reality they are places where social rules are 
radically different or even non-existent. Such places often give rise to their own urban legends 
such as the existence of the mole people in the New York underground subways systems 
(Dupler, 1994), or the ghosts that are said to inhabit abandoned houses (e.g.; Edensor 2004:1). 
 
REVISITING THE PAST. IDENTITY 
 
Sven Lindqvist’s book ‘Gräv där du står’ (Lindqvist, 
1978) [trans. ‘Dig Where You Stand’] is about how 
to research the workplace, or - rather - your 
workplace, from the perspective of the worker. In a 
section entitled ‘The Journey Back’ (Lindqvist, 
1978:13-16) he describes a trip to an abandoned 
English cement factory where he met an ex-cement 
worker called Cyril Edwards who, for 25 years, used 
to work at the factory. As Cyril enters into the 
abandoned factory his past suddenly returns to him 
and he eagerly explores the rooms, rusting 
machinery and instruments that remain. As his 
hands move over the wrecked, useless equipment he 
remembers his work, stories, friends and emotions 
that were so strongly connected to the place and had all but been forgotten until his return. 
Although Burström (2007) uses this example to talk about the power that objects have to recall 
lost memories, he doesn’t try to explain how such places and objects become such potent 
symbols in the first place. Here, we can consider in more depth the theory of experience (‘The 
World of Memory and Identity’, p. 6). For Cyril, the activities of 25 years play out themselves 
again in the abandoned factory. In Thomas’ (Thomas, 1999:36) terms he is re-enacting a ‘habitual 
use of space’, a habit learned and reinforced throughout his time at the factory. The use of space, 
 
Fig. 15. Haunted House or abandoned dwelling? 
‘He walks up to the hole in the furnace 
where he stood and stared into the glowing 
mass. Now what he stares into is a cold 
darkness. He checks, as usual, the 
instrument panel. Now it hangs loose, 
yanked from the wall and the dials swing, 
abandoned, this way and that in the wind... 
That hits him the hardest. The instruments 
that he stood and observed for 25 years 
with such care and responsibility, ready to 
instantly react to the smallest change, the 
instruments that meant everything now 
dangle in the wind and mean nothing.’ 
(Lindqvist, 1978:15, my translation) 
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according to Thomas, is intimately tied to the creation of identity so in effect, the re-enacting of 
acts performed in his past are a reassertion of his own personal identity. So identity and place 
really are connected, the vivid memories that return are a part of Cyril’s identity and his actions 
demonstrate the interrelation between identity and practice. 
Seeing familiar objects in an unfamiliar context often triggers strong reactions precisely because 
when embedded within their usual ‘familiar’ context we barely notice them at all until they are 
‘unworlded’ or brought to our attention (‘From The Familiar World to The Physical. 
Objectification’, p. 8). Exactly that happens to Cyril, forcing him to see them again and to 
consider their purpose and his own identity. Cyril’s experience of the abandoned cement factory 
is undoubtedly defined by what it was to him for 25 years. It is a place of the past, of work, and a 
place intimately tied to his identity through friendships, shared experiences and social action. 
 
  
 
Fig. 16. An abandoned cement factory. 
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EXPLORING ABANDONED PLACES 
 
The originally intended functions of places such as 
cement factories, do not determine the role they play in 
the creation of identities. Urban Adventuring is a 
surprisingly popular activity where ‘urban adventurers’ 
specifically seek out restricted areas, such as abandoned 
factories, tunnels, train stations, hospitals, schools and 
breweries, all in search of new experiences. Urban 
Adventurers themselves have constructed codes of 
ethics to legitimize their activity (Ninjalicious, No Date).  
The attraction of exploring such places is excitement, an 
excitement that is born of breaking social rules and 
seeing things that are not otherwise accessible to the 
general public. The experience of urban adventuring 
cannot be had through socially sanctioned action – 
guided tours of abandoned ruins are often used for 
reconnaissance purposes – and so an important part is 
the deliberate breaking of social rules (Ninjalicious, 
2005).  
So once again, the plurality of places, demonstrated in the first case study, becomes apparent as 
does the interrelation between people and place. For urban adventurers seeking excitement and 
adventure any particular abandoned cement factory is, in a sense, much like another. To Cyril, 
who has so many memories and experiences of a specific place, the cement factory means 
everything. Their actions and experiences within the same place are vastly different. The role the 
place plays in the construction of identity is very different, and each person’s identity produces 
different actions. 
 
Fig. 17. Urban adventurer in an abandoned Russian cement factory 
‘I find it sad that most people go 
through life oblivious to the countless 
— free — wonders around them. Too 
many of us think the only things worth 
looking at in our cities and towns are 
those safe and sanitized attractions 
that require an admission fee. It's no 
wonder people feel unfulfilled as they 
shuffle through the maze of velvet 
ropes on their way out through the gift 
shop. Urban explorers strive to actually 
earn their experiences, by making 
discoveries that allow them to get in on 
the secret workings of cities and 
structures, and to appreciate fantastic, 
obscure spaces that might otherwise 
go completely neglected.’ (Ninjalicious, 
No Date) 
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THE ABANDONED LONG HOUSES OF NEOLITHIC EUROPE 
 
It has been well-documented that throughout the early 
Neolithic period of central and south-eastern Europe, the 
inhabitants of settlements would periodically abandon 
their houses and build new ones close-by. These houses 
stood year after year slowly decaying, or were deliberately 
burned and left to collapse. The new were not built on 
the same location as the older buildings; they almost 
never overlapped and the old building materials were 
apparently not reused. This means that sometimes the 
abandoned houses would remain fully visible in their 
decay, as part of the village (Bradley, 1996). 
These ‘The Houses of the Dead’ and the similarities 
between long houses and long mounds is an idea that can 
be traced back to Gordon Childe (1949:135) and 
numerous theories have been put forth as to why this 
might be so. As Tringham makes clear (right) when a 
house reaches the end of its use-life, in archaeological 
reports, is assumed to have simply ceased to exist. Its 
continued existence is rarely discussed and neither is the impact an event such as abandonment 
might have on its inhabitants. 
The modern examples presented above (see ‘Revisiting The Past. Identity’ and ‘Exploring 
Abandoned Places’) demonstrate that just because a place is abandoned it doesn’t mean that 
activity within it ceases, and that such places can have a great deal of power over the individuals 
that dwelt within them. 
 
  
Many dramatic changes in social life 
undoubtedly accompanied those 
terms that we write so blithely: “the 
household in the decline and at the 
end of its cycle” and “the end of the 
use-life of a house”. It is tempting to 
envisage the whole process of 
abandoning old houses and locating 
and constructing new ones coldly and 
objectively. Recent ethnographic and 
non-Western architectural studies, 
however, abound with accounts of the 
significant impact that these 
processes have on the lives of the men 
and women involved. A “house” is 
part of their social lives, with a life-
cycle of its own, even to the extent of 
being a person.’ (Tringham, 1991:123-
124) 
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LONG HOUSE SETTLEMENT SITES 
 
The geographical extent of the settlements in Europe that practiced the construction of long 
houses range from the Olszanica settlement in Poland to within a few kilometers of the west 
coast of France (Laporte & Tinévez, 2004), with many of the key sites existing in Germany such 
as the Merzbach and Langweiler settlements in eastern Germany (Bradley, 1996). There is much 
evidence of abandonment at these sites. At Opovo, Serbia (Tringham, et al., 1992) all the houses 
were burned but at different times, thus ruling out accidental fires, whereas at Laurenzberg the 
average life-use of the house was 27 years, far less time than construction of the house would 
allow. Additionally, there is no evidence that the house materials were reused. So it appears that 
these houses were deliberately abandoned (Bradley, 1996:247). It is clear that the houses, far 
from ‘disappearing’ after abandonment, remain in plain sight within the villages long after the 
event, perhaps giving rise to the ‘basic idea of the long barrow.’ (Bradley 1996:248). 
  
 
Fig. 18. Extent of long house construction in Neolithic Europe. 
The Opovo settlement site (4700-4500 
B.C.) in northern Serbia from the late 
Vinca culture. (Tringham, et al., 1985, 
1992) 
The western extent of the LBK culture 
including the Balloy settlement and long 
barrow site. Here a long barrow was 
constructed over a destroyed long 
house (Laporte & Tinévez, 2004) 
The Merzbach, Laurenzberg and 
Langweiler sites of western Germany 
(LBK). These are LBK settlement sites dated 
from 5300-4850 BC (Bradley, 1996:247). The Olszanica settlement site in 
southern Poland. This was an LBK site 
dated to approximately 4400 B.C 
(Milisauskas, 1972, 1973) 
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LONG BARROW SITES 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 19. Extent of long barrow and long cairn sites in Neolithic Europe. 
The Kilham IId long barrow dated to 
3670 B.C. This mound bears remarkable 
similarities to LBK houses. (Bradley 
(1996:243) 
The Barkaer long mounds in Jutland, 
Denmark. These were initially interpreted 
as houses during excavation (Glob, 1975). 
Long mounds and long cairns are found 
all along the Atlantic coast from Iberia 
to Scandinavia (Bradley, 1996:242). 
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CONNECTING LONG HOUSES AND LONG MOUNDS 
 
As stated, the abandoned long houses of the Neolithic of Central Europe have been referred to 
as ‘Houses of the Dead’ (e.g.; Hodder, 1990; Bradley, 1996; Sherratt, 1990) and the connection 
between the long houses and long mounds of northern Europe goes as far back as Oscar 
Montelius. The role of the houses after abandonment is not expanded upon. The argument that 
a connection exists between the two phenomena lies in their structural similarities. Hodder 
(1984) lists eight points of similarity between the houses of central Europe and the long mounds 
of northern Europe, based on the physical dimensions and other features of both. Indeed, 
during excavation it is not always easy to tell one from the other exemplified by the famous long 
mound at Barkaer, Denmark, which was originally interpreted as a house and only later 
reinterpreted as a long mound (Glob, 1975). 
 
There are currently two geographical candidates where mounds and houses coexist, and thus the 
idea of long houses as ‘houses of the dead’ might have spread to Atlantic Europe. The first is in 
Poland where there is a cultural overlap (Hodder, 1990:148, Bradley, 1996) allowing the spread 
of the idea of ‘houses of the dead’ to long mound construction in the Polish lowlands. An 
alternative location is in France (Laporte & Tinévez, 2004) where, as in the case of the Balloy 
excavation south of Paris, a long barrow was built directly on top of a destroyed long house 
(Scarre, 2005:418). So within the archaeological record there is enough evidence to suggest that 
there is a connection between long houses and long mounds. The next question to answer is 
why.  
 
Fig. 20. Comparison of a long house from Olszanica, Poland and the 
long barrow at Kilham, England. Taken from Bradley (1996:243) 
The Olszanica Long House The Kilham IId Long Mound 
Postholes 
Mound 
Bedding Trench 
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MOTIVATION. SOME ARCHAEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS 
 
The key problem with many explanations as to why 
Neolithic monuments were built are that they rely upon 
the idea that the establishment of farming requires a 
greater degree of social control (e.g.; Sherratt, 1990; 
Renfrew, 1976), whether because of increased social 
complexity or increased territorial competition. The need 
for either is debatable, however, since the extent to 
which farming existed, the abundance of food resources 
and the population densities in the Neolithic cultures of 
Atlantic Europe (Milisauskas, 2002:156) suggest that 
there simply isn’t a convincing functional argument that 
these were serious concerns. As Hodder (1984) famously 
stated, people are not fooled by ideology; simply because 
a possibility exists does not mean it would be followed. In such functional accounts it is 
therefore not people who are the prime motivators but history itself. If there is no functional 
necessity behind the construction of monuments as centres for institutionalised activity then the 
idea would need some other resonance within society. Monuments remarkably similar to long 
houses were, after all, built in Atlantic Europe and coincide with the introduction of farming. 
Collective monument building might therefore facilitate, or even trigger increased social 
complexity but where did the idea come from? 
In structuralist interpretations of the same evidence the ideologies of prehistoric people 
dominates their motivations. Hodder’s (1990) interpretation presents a far more sophisticated 
explanation for the process involved in the transfer of the idea of the ‘house of the dead’ into 
Atlantic European cultures but, as Bradley (1996:246) points out ‘it is difficult to see how such 
changes were effected. Who devised them, and why did 
they come to mind?’  
It is Bradley’s (1996) interpretation that provides the best 
explanation for this ‘transfer of ideas’. He argues that it 
is the continued presence of these monuments in the 
everyday lives of the inhabitants of these settlements that 
gave birth to the idea of the houses of the dead. As 
stated earlier, these houses – though abandoned – would 
have remained in full sight, slowly decaying. The long 
mounds were ‘meant to evoke the past significance of 
the long house’ (Bradley, 1996:246). What remains in this 
interpretation is to explain why the long houses were so 
evocative and how this might have lead to increased 
social complexity. 
 
‘It can … be argued that these 
tombs…were as basic a feature of 
early cereal agriculture as the hoe and 
axe: the material infrastructure of the 
organization of labour was crucial in 
the establishment of horticulture as 
the more obvious elements of 
technology … In a society where 
labour was the most important 
commodity, moving large stones 
symbolized the workforce that could 
be assembled at any one time.’ 
(Sherratt, 1990:150) 
‘The built environment is not simply a 
representation of a set of abstract 
ideas. It is through their engagement 
with that environment in the course of 
daily life that individuals learn how to 
become members of society.’ Bradley 
(1996:246) 
‘The everyday experience of living in a 
settlement where many of the houses 
had been abandoned might have been 
enough to create an association 
between the form of the long house 
and the celebration of the dead.’ 
(Bradley, 1996:250) 
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THE POWER OF LIVED EXPERIENCE 
 
Unlike modern day abandoned places (see ‘Exploring Abandoned Places’, p. 24) there is little or 
no evidence to suggest continued activity in the ruins of the abandoned long houses. Edensor 
(2005) and the urban adventurers demonstrate, however, that contemporary abandoned places 
cannot automatically be assumed to be outside of society since they still play a variety of roles. 
The act of abandonment is, at its most abstract, a deliberate transformation of a place’s social 
role. Plainly as ‘houses of the dead’ the houses are not abandoned at all but still play a role in 
people’s identities. It is also important to point out that the power of such events is not 
necessarily felt by everyone in the settlement and depends very much on the roles each person 
plays along with their own motivations for action (e.g.; Edensor, 2005; Moore, 1996). This opens 
the door for meanings to change throughout time as different people and social groups, with 
differing ideas and experiences vie for expression. All this can happen without the need for 
cataclysmic external events or influences. 
Familiarity with a place comes through the constant action of the tasks that define everyday life. 
Places and identities form and develop each other and it is often through the sudden disruption 
of everyday life that we recognize it fully. The long houses of the Neolithic were without doubt 
places full of memories and intimately interwoven with the identities of the people who dwelt in 
them. They are participants in the process of the identity creation in daily practice. The 
abandonment of a dwelling is a powerful event in human life, not simply because of its symbolic 
significance but because it is such a fundamental part of a person’s identity; Cyril’s return to the 
cement factory (‘Revisiting The Past. Identity’, p. 22) demonstrates clearly the power such places 
have. Abandonment, whether joyful, sad or amusing, is powerful in a way that structuralism or 
functionalism can’t capture. It is important to point out that the argument for powerful 
experience is not based on some notion of sentimentality of the part of past people at the loss of 
a family home; experiences are contextual, different for everyone (see ‘The Trip. Frozen Waves 
or Muddy Waters?’, p. 15). The argument is based on the sudden transformation of the 
intimately familiar, where lived, naturalized experience has been embedded in individual 
identities to a new place where different social rules apply. The powerful experiences 
surrounding such events make it a good candidate for ‘recycling’ into other forms as ideologies 
change and thus lends weight to Bradley’s interpretation of abandoned houses. This power 
provides a specific reason why Long Mounds took the form that they did. 
THE POWER OF MEMORY 
 
Using Nora’s (1989) division between memory and history, the long mounds could therefore 
represent a ‘lieux de memoire’ and the construction of a controlled history of ancestry through 
institutionalized ritual practice. Access to the houses of the dead suddenly occurs under 
specifically controlled forms. Thus the bodily movement of people is controlled but further, the 
memory of people’s ancestors is rooted in an environment other than where lived experiences 
and memories were played out (the house). This ‘softens’ the bonds between place, action and 
identity. The long house no longer plays a part in the memory of the ancestor’s, where contact 
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between the living and the dead (once living) was actually played out. A history of the ancestors 
can be now used to replace memory. It would be the appropriation of a powerful act, an 
excellent choice upon which to build or support a more institutionalized form of ritual.  
There is no need to argue for a pre-existing need to appropriate the memory and ritual practices 
surrounding the worship of ancestors, which would necessitate the building of large communal 
monuments, however. If monuments became ‘lieux de memoire’ then they might simply have 
created the opportunity to institutionalize ritual practice, thus focusing social control in a few 
hands.  
WAYS FORWARD 
 
Ultimately we really don’t know why these Neolithic long houses were abandoned and what 
significance they had afterwards. We don’t know if they were forbidden territory or continued to 
serve another role in society, but it is likely that some human activity, either sanctioned or 
subversive, continued in some form. While existing in memory they would still have a power 
over the village inhabitants and act as foci for various activities. People saw them, ignored them 
acted around them, etc. 
1. Could the houses be entered again?  
2. Did children do it anyway for kicks? Or adults?  
3. How might they have triggered memories of the past? Of friends and family?  
4. Were memories treasured, of good times or bad? 
5. What of the sense of entering such places? Was their fear and/or a thrill when entering 
forbidden zones, even if no physical barrier prevented it? 
 
Perhaps the archaeological record should be examined again in more detail, looking for evidence 
that might illuminate alternative activities at such sites, even after they apparently went out of 
use. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Objects and places are far more than functional devices or symbols for shared meanings. They 
are most often an intimately familiar part of our lives, embedded and inseparable from our 
projects within the world and our very identities. The largest part of what an object was to people 
in the past is gone because the people of the past are gone. There is an ‘experiential gap’. Ruth 
Tringham’s (1991:124) fictional account of the Neolithic long house fire at Opovo (presented in 
the introduction to this essay) is an attempt to illustrate ‘the facelessness’ of people in our 
accounts of the past, and this facelessness is due to this ‘gap’. Attempts to use fictional narratives 
in interpretations of the past can only ever raise awareness of it, but never fill it.  
There is no need to turn to fiction when an understanding of human experience can help us to 
do so. No matter how we try, descriptions of past lives, and the explanations for those lives, will 
remain at best two-dimensional until we explicitly recognize the inseparability of places, things 
and people, and their thoughts, motivations and ideals. These experiences are always mutable 
and multiple.  
The relationship between people and things can radically differ, and that arguing for experiential 
similarities across vast time-spaces is therefore highly problematic. Personal experience of a thing 
can never produce an understanding of that thing that another might have without first 
discussing who this ‘other’ is and what their motivations are for being there. The constitution of 
experience, as an inseparable mix of mind, body and the world prevents the identification of 
‘prehistoric’ experiences in the present. The past simply cannot be experienced and therefore if 
we want to put human experience back into the past we need to be wary of using personal 
experiences to do so. 
Of course there is no likely correlation between activities in modern abandoned factories and the 
abandoned longhouses of Neolithic Europe and this essay does not represent an attempt to draw 
ethnographic parallels between our culture and a prehistoric one. It demonstrates, though, that 
change and the appropriation or alteration of activities and beliefs for new ends can easily be 
motivated by the power that certain experiences have on us. The deliberate abandonment of a 
dwelling is a powerful event that has experiential resonance.  
Additionally this case study provides clear examples that abandonment does not necessarily 
mean forgotten or erased. It is a transformation of social rules, permitting different forms of 
behavior, and thus we can radically alter the meanings of places at will. The same place can be 
experienced and acted within in fundamentally different ways. This suggests that archaeologists 
should look again at the Neolithic long houses of central Europe in particular, and the life 
histories of other prehistoric sites in general, in order to discuss their continued roles within 
societies. 
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